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Pivot 1.1 
There is a dishonest claim central to many conversations about 
adaptation, namely that replication is possible across media—
that some element of a text can be copied or transferred from 
a source to a target medium. This claim is immediately evident 
in mainstream discourses around source-fidelity, but underlies 
much of the academic criticism on the subject as well. This 
claim, however, ignores essential material differences: as 
much as an actor in a 
film adaptation may 
resemble the imagined 
image of the originary 
character, the former is 
imparted through light 
captured on celluloid, 
while the latter is 
imparted through an arrangement of words on a page. Even 
the concept of equivalence—that an adaptation works by 
discovering medium-specific elements analogous to those in 
the source text—emphasizes sameness in adaptations, without 
adequately acknowledging the impossibility of literal 
equivalence. Despite this impossibility, an audience’s 
experience of an adaptation as such is nevertheless founded on 
just such a perception of similarity. Audiences come to 
understand the intertextual meaning of an adaptation only by 
actively recognizing the relationship between the source and 
adapted texts. If this relationship is not one of replication or 
equivalence, it is my contention that adaptation is a class of 
metaphor, depending on a paradoxical relationship that 
equates unequal terms. 
The medium-specific material differences that render literal 
replication in adaptation impossible are perhaps best 
demonstrated by example. Robert Rodriguez’s film adaptation 
of Frank Miller’s graphic novel Sin City is frequently discussed 
in terms of its similarity to its source text. A brief Google 
search for audience reactions to Sin City as an adaptation 
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turns up several examples exemplifying this perception to a 
near-absurd degree: “[Sin City is] also the first (and probably 
only) adaptation that stays 100% true to its original material” 
(Usumezbas); “Miller’s vision lives and breathes and Sin City 
took the life from his graphic novel and cut and pasted it onto 
the screen” (Lloyd); “My biggest problem with the 2005 film is 
that it was just an expensive motion comic. In my book, it is 
the prime example of why no one should do a 100% faithful 
adaptation. There’s just no reason for it to exist if it’s not going 
to separate itself from its source material” (Goldberg). As the 
last quotation suggests, even someone who does not see 
fidelity as the ideal may still see it as a theoretical possibility. 
Side-by-side comparisons of pages from the graphic novel and 
stills from the film, which can be found in several comparison 
libraries online (cf. Longworth), reveal a striking visual 
similarity between the two works. Despite this and the 
reactions quoted above, the film version of Sin City is not and 
could not be a replication of its source. The characters in the 
film are portrayed by live actors, whereas the comic’s 
characters are illustrations; the film involves dynamic motion 
at twenty-four frames per second, whereas the comic merely 
implies motion by juxtaposing images in separate panels; and 
the film is light captured on celluloid, while the comic is ink on 
paper. The physical material of the medium is crucial: an 
adaptation made in a different medium is essentially different, 
even if it can somehow be perceived to be completely faithful. 
If differences between adaptations and adapted texts are as 
significant as I suggest, then audiences’ expectations of 
sameness in an adaptation need elaboration. Firstly, it should 
be noted that audiences also expect difference. Few, if any, 
audiences begin their experience of an adaptation with an 
expectation of encountering an exact replica: if literal 
sameness was the overarching motivation, then audiences 
would likely just return to the source. I must grant the 
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possibility that sentiments like “cut and pasted” are hyperboles 
employed by passionate fans to (over-)emphasize their 
perceptions. The anticipation of sameness is often less all-
encompassing than these phrasings suggest; it is more likely 
to function as the (perhaps subconscious) belief that the new 
medium will replicate various elements of the source even if 
the medium itself necessitates overt changes. 
This kind of belief still fits under the umbrella term “fidelity,” 
but its logic works more subtly than the usual chorus that the 
novel was better than the film. The 2010 collection Beyond 
Adaptation: Essays on Radical Transformations of Original 
Works purports to focus on works that do not merely adapt 
their sources, but depart from them in more extensive ways. 
Part of the argument that editors Phyllis Frus and Christy 
Williams propose in their introduction to the collection is that 
the term “transformation” offers a way to get beyond the 
fidelity discourse that seems inherently caught up in the word 
“adaptation.” Frus and Williams advocate that “transformation” 
be used to describe more significant departures from sources, 
while the term “adaptation” be retained for works that are 
“limited to representing a source text” (5). In framing the 
collection this way, however, Frus and Williams gloss over the 
significant necessary differences between adaptations and their 
sources. In so doing, they reinforce the place of fidelity 
idealism in the study of “adaptation,” even as they advocate 
“transformation” as a way out of this dead end (5). However, 
since transformation implies transference as well as 
alteration—there must be a kernel from the source in the new 
text that has undergone the drastic change—Frus and 
Williams’s language continues to rely on rhetoric that indirectly 
implies the logic of replication. The logic of this terminology 
leads to questions of what in a source text gets transferred, 
how we recognize it once it is altered, and what the process of 
transitioning elements from one text to another entails. 
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Questions like this—often phrased in terms of “what gets 
adapted and how?”—were the subject of ongoing debates in 
adaptation studies from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s, but 
the current conversation has largely shifted away from such 
concerns. The shift occurred, in part, because critics seemed to 
agree both that the relationships between the texts involved in 
any given adaptation are more complex than the logic of 
transference or equivalence allows, and that there are 
ultimately many other much more interesting areas of concern 
in the field, such as production contexts and the processes of 
reception (Cartmell and Whelehan 6; Cutchins et al., Pedagogy 
xii; Leitch “Crossroads” 76; Murray 5). Current work 
predominantly supports the idea that there are more 
differences than similarities between texts that move across 
various media. Theorists suggest that adaptation studies 
ultimately benefit from the recognition that elements like 
character, narrative, story, spirit, tone, and style are either too 
intimately related to the medium of expression for any notion 
of transference or equivalence to hold water, or are too 
ineffable to properly theorize (Andrew 100-3; Hutcheon 10, 16, 
171; Leitch “Fallacies,” 168; Raitt 51; Stam, “Theory,” 49). 
Regardless of this shift in the academic conversation, popular 
discourse still employs the shaky rhetoric of transference, 
equivalence, and replication, as the Sin City examples quoted 
above suggest. It is thus worth returning to this discourse in 
order to ask why it continues to be so seductive. 
George Raitt addresses what he terms as “fidelity lust” by 
suggesting, somewhat paradoxically, that the attraction to 
fidelity is a “fascination with difference” (55). For Raitt, 
sameness and equivalence are not mutually exclusive with 
difference, because the statuses “alike” and “unlike” are 
relative. They will vary according to the specific criteria being 
used as the principle of comparison (55). He uses the following 
analogy to explain his meaning: an orange is different from 
every other orange in subtle ways, yet they are all the same 
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kind of fruit, sharing a similar taste. Apples are different from 
oranges, and yet both are equivalent in their capacity to satisfy 
hunger (Raitt 55). While objects may be seen as the same 
according to one principle of comparison, they may still be 
different according to other principles. It is only by the strict 
adherence to one principle, one perspective in the process of 
comparison, that two objects may be deemed the same. Raitt 
suggests that by studying adaptations in line with this 
understanding, the role of the reader/viewer becomes 
centralized. It is each audience member that determines his or 
her principle of comparison when evaluating the relative 
“sameness” and “difference” of the adaptation/source 
relationship (55). Raitt, however, does not elaborate further on 
the reader/viewer’s role—how it functions, what it requires—
and so more inquiry is needed into the ways in which 
audiences understand adaptations as intertextually meaningful. 
Raitt also does not take as a premise that “sameness” is a 
literal impossibility, instead seeing it as overshadowing the 
fruitful possibilities inherent in the study of “difference.” If we 
accept the premise that an adaptation and its source text are 
not literally the same or equivalent to their sources on any 
level, how can we account for the pervasiveness of the 
tendency to see adaptations as involving partial replication? 
Julie Sanders writes that “it is usually at the very point of 
infidelity that the most creative acts of adaptation … take 
place” (20). I intend to push this claim one step further by 
suggesting that it is at the very point of infidelity that all 
adaptations take place. This is clear when we understand 
sameness, not as an inherent feature of an adaptive text, but 
as a function of the reader or viewer’s role. Since fidelity 
depends on the perception of sameness where there is, in a 
literal sense, none, there can be only varying degrees of 
infidelity. Put another way, the relationship between texts is 
not so much revealed as created. 
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The drive to find similarities between an adaptation and the 
original is very strong. If there were only differences, there 
would be no distinction between adaptations and wholly unique 
texts. Thus the phenomenon of adaptation is paradoxical: 
adaptations are fundamentally different from their sources, 
and yet the perception of sameness is necessary to understand 
adaptations as such. A closer look at the “very point” of 
infidelity is needed in order to tease out the details of this 
paradox. This theory must take stock of the impulse to fidelity, 
a hermeneutic inclination powerful enough for the logic of 
transference to so pervade the popular and critical discourse 
surrounding adaptation. 
There is a basic interpretive process undergirding this paradox 
of adaptation, which Nietzsche suggests, in “On Truth and 
Falsity in their Extramoral Sense,” is fundamental to the 
formation of all ideas. He writes, 
Let us especially think about the formation of ideas. Every 
word becomes at once an idea not by having, as one 
might presume, to serve as a reminder for the original 
experience happening but once and absolutely 
individualized […] but by having simultaneously to fit 
innumerable, more or less similar (which really means 
never equal, therefore altogether unequal) cases. Every 
idea originates through equating the unequal. (5) 
Not only can we designate things as “the same” which are 
inherently different, but we must do so in order to 
communicate at all. As Nietzsche argues, we only know “leaf” 
by an “arbitrary omission” of the differences between individual 
leaves (5), so too do we understand adaptations as such. We 
can say that a character, plot device, motif, or image is the 
same as another such element in another text only by means 
of an arbitrary omission of the traits that differentiate them. 
These traits include, as explored earlier, the various ways that 
the material differences of the medium render literal 
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replication or transference across media impossible. Though he 
does not cite Nietzsche, Raitt’s analogy of the apples and 
oranges should come to mind. Raitt emphasizes the 
importance of difference, and its paradoxical non-exclusivity 
with notions of sameness and equivalence. Through Nietzsche, 
we see that all ideas require the omission of differences in 
order for relationships of equivalence to become intelligible. 
Where Raitt stops just shy of naming the phenomenon that 
enables this paradoxical equating of the unequal, Nietzsche 
suggests that this enabler is metaphor, which he describes as 
the leap “out of one sphere right into the midst of an entirely 
different one” (4). As adaptations are distinct texts, the ability 
to understand them in a relationship of equivalence to their 
sources requires just such a metaphoric leap. George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson, in Metaphors We Live By, suggest that “the 
essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one 
kind of thing in terms of another” (5). The inclusiveness of 
their definition, like that of Neitzsche, supports the idea that 
metaphoric thought is central to the interpretive process 
underlying the experience of an adaptation. This aligns well 
with Linda Hutcheon’s argument that we experience 
adaptations as oscillations between the text currently being 
witnessed and our memories of the source text (8, 121): as we 
watch, read, or play the adaptation, we flip back and forth in 
our minds to other texts we have experienced, forming 
connections and exploring possible relationships. In order for 
an adaptation to be meaningful as such, audiences must make 
a strong identification in this process of oscillation. They must 
commit to experiencing the text (the adaptation) specifically in 
terms of the memory of a previously experienced text (the 
source). 
Every idea, like that of Nietzsche’s leaf, exists relationally. We 
do not know Nietzsche’s leaf as a thing-in-itself, existing in the 
world, but rather by establishing a fixed convention that 
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organizes what we arbitrarily omit: a pine leaf is not a bay 
leaf, as a bay leaf is not a maple leaf—and so on ad infinitum, 
though all of these are referred to equally by the word leaf. 
The relationality of ideas moves a step further with Derrida’s 
argument that meaning is produced through the play of 
signification (354). Adaptations are likewise meaningful 
through the play of substitutions in the closed system of 
language (Derrida 365). The supplementary nature of signs 
enables the intertextuality that, in turn, enables adaptation. 
That this is a metaphoric process can be made clear with 
reference to Max Black’s “system of associated commonplaces” 
(40). Black uses the example of “wolf” as a sign that organizes 
sets of associations: 
The idea of a wolf is part of a system of ideas, not sharply 
delineated, and yet sufficiently definite to admit of 
detailed enumeration. The effect, then, of calling a man a 
“wolf” is to evoke the wolf-system of related 
commonplaces. If the man is a wolf, he preys upon other 
animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a 
scavenger and so on. Each of these implied assertions has 
now to be made to fit the principal subject (the man) […] 
Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked 
about in “wolf-language” will be rendered prominent, and 
any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The 
wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes 
others—in short, organizes our view of man. (40-1; italics 
in original) 
Similarly, adaptations work by deeming one text (at least 
partially) to be the same as a previously existing text. Doing so 
instigates the relational interaction of the two texts. 
Adaptations come to function not as a single extended 
metaphor, but as a connected series of opportunities to engage 
various systems of associated commonplaces in productive 
interaction. It is thus that the perception of sameness is not 
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found in an adaptation itself, but created by the audience’s 
playful equation of two unequal texts through the omission of 
various material traits. As it is a process bound up in the play 
of signifiers, adaptations are not necessarily experienced as 
such. It is wholly possible to view an adaptation, even of a 
familiar text, and not think of it as adaptive. The process of 
interpreting an adaptation as such not only requires the 
reader/viewer to know, directly or indirectly, the various sign 
structures that comprise the adapted text, but requires him or 
her to also actively engage in the playful interaction of the two 
texts by perceiving their metaphoric linkage. I use the word 
“actively” because the process of experiencing an adaptation is 
productive, generative of new meanings, not merely an 
exercise in passive reception. However, like an everyday 
conversation, where the play of language usually happens 
effortlessly—unconsciously—the play of adaptation often occurs 
without pause. It is thus that the metaphoric equating of 
unequal texts is obscured, a hidden seam that binds the two 
unlike materials. 
Since it is this metaphoric stitching that connects the texts 
involved in an adaptation, the recognition of sameness is a 
prerequisite to interpreting an adaptation as such. Paul Ricouer 
writes of “the wonderful ‘it was and it was not,’ which contains 
[in a nutshell] all that can be said about metaphorical truth” 
(224). I suggest that “it was and it was not” also contains all 
that can be said about the “truth” of adaptation. Pushed far 
enough, there is nothing to maintain the notion that adaptation 
involves replication or transference. An adaptation, rather, is 
the result of a clear understanding in the audience’s mind that 
an adaptive relationship exists between two texts. This 
understanding is powerful enough to identify unlike objects 
even where literal sameness is an impossibility. Ricouer 
suggests that “metaphor creates the resemblance rather than 
finding and expressing it” (236). In the same fashion, 
adaptation as a class of metaphor works by creating sameness 
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or equivalence. The interpretive processes that enable this 
creation are akin to what Nietzsche terms dissimulation, that 
character of forgetfulness that permits humankind to exist 
beyond discrete, unique experiences—that is, to communicate 
general ideas, and so to exist socially (3). As a trope for 
discussing adaptation, dissimulation encompasses the “it was 
and it was not” of metaphor; it acknowledges that the 
fundamental difference between texts can nonetheless be 
experienced as sameness. Those elements that we perceive as 
true (in the sense of equal) in the relationship between an 
adaptation and its originary text are, as Nietzsche says of all 
truths, “illusions of which one has forgotten that they are 
illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to 
affect the senses” (5). The wearing out of metaphor is likewise 
how an adaptation comes to be understood as faithful or 
equivalent to its source: the result of forgetfulness regarding 
the “it was not” of metaphoric coupling. 
There are actually two sets of worn-out metaphors at work in 
the rhetoric undergirding adaptation theories of transference 
and equivalence. On the one hand, the adaptations are 
themselves worn-out metaphors. They not only function by 
audiences’ equation of the unequal, but audiences are so used 
to this process of playful interaction that the fallacious nature 
of the identification fades away. They are illusions forgotten as 
illusions. On the other hand, the language of transference and 
equivalence has itself lost its metaphoric function. In referring 
to an adaptation as a transposition or a functional equivalent 
(McFarlane 6, 22), we evoke the metaphor of transference, 
often without recognizing that that is what we are doing. As 
shorthand, there is nothing wrong with discussing adaptation 
in such terms. Indeed, the equating of texts can be so strong, 
as with Sin City and its adaptation, that it seems as though the 
comic was transferred onto the screen, and there is no 
absolute reason that it should not be discussed in this way. 
The issue arises when the “it was not” of metaphor is not 
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properly acknowledged. Ultimately, the comic was not 
transferred: actors were cast and assembled on a soundstage; 
a screenplay was written and edited; producers, directors, set 
dressers, costume designers, and a myriad of other individuals 
made choices that impacted the final film; a soundscape and 
musical score were recorded and edited, as were the hours of 
shot footage, the various takes, the various angles; and so on. 
The medium-specific production processes render the material 
of an adaptation entirely distinct from the adapted text. The 
apparent sameness in the relationship of an adaptation to its 
source, enabled by the power of the metaphorical “is,” 
accounts for the impulse to fidelity; forgetfulness about the “is 
not”—the Nietzschean dissimulation—accounts for the rhetoric 
of fidelity. 
As the field of adaptation studies continues to expand and 
develop, it is crucial to recognize the ongoing challenge raised 
by the strength of the metaphoric “is” and its tendency to 
obscure the “is not.” As Raitt suggests, the paradoxical co-
existence of sameness and difference in adaptation centralizes 
the reader/viewer. It is up to the audience member to form the 
connection, to explore the relationship between texts in 
whatever fashion suits that person. In regards to the popular 
consumption of adaptations, there is no great harm in 
discussing them as faithful or not, nor in using the terms of 
transference and equivalence; the wearing out of metaphors is 
part of the way that language develops. However, it is possible 
that a wider recognition of adaptation’s metaphoric function 
could play a role in improving strategies of media literacy. 
Future work on adaptation as metaphor will hopefully 
contribute to this initiative. We may continue to desire a 
degree of faithfulness in the adaptations of the texts we love, 
just as we may continue to view successful adaptations as 
accurate transpositions of the source text. But if we learn to 
recognize the roots of this desire and this perspective, we may 
learn to recognize, and then enhance, the complex intertextual 
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exchange that occurs. Even if there is nothing necessarily lost 
in believing the lie of fidelity idealism, there may be much to 
be gained through a heightened awareness that it is, after all, 
a lie.  
Works Cited 
Andrew, Dudley. Concepts in Film Theory. New York: Oxford 
UP, 1984. Web. 30 November 2010. 
Black, Max. Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and 
Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1962. Print. 
Cartmell, Deborah, and Imelda Whelehan. Screen Adaptation: 
Impure Cinema. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Print. 
Cutchins, Dennis, Laurence Raw, and James M. Welsh, eds. 
The Pedagogy of Adaptation Studies. Lanham, MD: 
Scarecrow P, 2010. Print. 
---. Redefining Adaptation Studies. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow P, 
2010. Print. 
Derrida, Jacques. “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of 
the Human Sciences.” Writing and Difference. 1967. 
Trans. Alan Bass. London: Routledge, 2005. 351-70. Print. 
Frus, Phyllis, and Christy Williams, eds. Beyond Adaptation: 
Essays on Radical Transformations of Original Works. 
Jefferson: McFarland, 2010. Print. 
Hutcheon, Linda. A Theory of Adaptation. New York: 
Routledge, 2006. Print. 
Goldberg, Matt. “Updates on Frank Miller’s Sin City 2 and Hard 
Boiled.” Collider.com. 29 Oct 2009. Web. 9 Jan 2009. 
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. 
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980. Print. 
 81 
Pivot 1.1 
Leitch, Thomas. “Adaptation Studies at a Crossroads.” 
Adaptation: The Journal of Literature on Screen Studies 
1.1 (2008): 63-77. Web. 4 Dec 2010. 
---. “Twelve Fallacies in Contemporary Adaptation Theory.” 
Criticism 45.2 (2003): 149-71. Web. 18 Nov 2010. 
Lloyd, Jake. “Ultimate 20 Comic Book Film Adaptations.” 
Fandomania. 9 Sep 2009. Web. 9 Jan 2011. 
Longworth, Karina. “The SIN CITY Comparison Library.” The 
Moviefone Blog. AOL, 5 Apr 2005. Web. 4 Dec 2010. 
McFarlane, Brian. Novel to Film: An Introduction to the Theory 
of Adaptation. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1996. Print. 
Murray, Simone. “Materializing Adaption Theory: The Adaption 
Industry.” Literature Film Quarterly 36.1 (2008): 4-20. 
Web. 24 Nov 2010. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On Truth and Falsity in their Extramoral 
Sense.” 1873. Essays on Metaphor. Ed. W. Shibles. 
Whitewater: Language P, 1972. 1-14. Print. 
Raitt, George. “Still Lusting After Fidelity?” Literature Film 
Quarterly 38.1 (Jan 2010): 47-58. Web. 13 Nov 2010. 
Ricoeur, Paul. The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies 
of the Creation of Meaning in Language. Trans. Robert 
Czerny. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1975. Print. 
Sanders, Julie. Adaptation and Appropriation. New York: 
Routledge, 2006. Print. 
Sin City. Dirs. Robert Rodriguez and Frank Miller. Dimension 
Films, 2005. DVD. 
Stam, Robert. “Beyond Fidelity: The Dialogics of Adaptation.” 
Film Adaptation (2000): 54-76. Print. 
 82 
On Truth and Falsity in their Intertextual Sense 
---. “Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Adaptation.” 
Literature and Film: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of 
Film Adaptation. Eds. Robert Stam and Alessandra 
Raengo. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. 1-52. Print. 
Usumezbas, Anil. “Top 10 Comic Book/Graphic Novel 
Adaptations,” The Long Take. 11 Aug 2008. Web. 9 Jan 
2011. 
Nico Dicecco is a Ph.D. candidate in English at Simon Fraser 
University. His current research examines innovations in 
adaptation studies methodology, with a focus on reception 
theory and visual/print culture. His other research interests 
include sexuality studies, performance theory, graphic novels, 
film, video games, and contemporary literature. 
